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This article is dedicated to Ponti Venter for his contribution to the historical roots and 
systematic implications of philosophical problems. A discussion with him about four 
decades ago prompted me to investigate the Greek roots of our distinction of thought and 
being. In the analysis below, a brief sketch was given of the initial identification of thought 
and being in the thought of Parmenides and the consequences it had for the rationalistic 
tradition since the Renaissance, particularly in connection with the view that the universe 
itself has a rational structure. Two options were pursued in our analysis of rationalism: (1) 
to contrast it with empiricism and (2) to relate it to universality and the problem of what 
is individual. By distinguishing between conceptual and concept-transcending knowledge, 
an alternative systematic characterisation of rationalism (and irrationalism) is proposed, 
namely that it absolutises conceptual knowledge (whilst irrationalism deifies concept-
transcending knowledge). This view allows for an acknowledgement of the ontic horizon of 
human experience, co-constituted by the dimensions of modal aspects and type laws, without 
elevating human understanding to become the law-giver of the world.
Introduction
It is a privilege to contribute to the Festschrift – a special issue of Koers, dedicated to the 
philosophical work of Ponti Venter. About 40 years ago we attended the same ‘Werk Colleges’ 
(seminars of Professor Van Riessen) in Amsterdam (Free University) as part of the doctoral 
program that we both followed. What struck me from the beginning was the piercing way in 
which Ponti always went to the root of an issue and then produced a challenging stance.
Orientation
This contribution aims at exploring something contemplated in a discussion after one of Van 
Riessen’s seminars. It will serve as a starting point for a classical philosophical problem, namely 
the relationship between thought and being and the facilitating role this issue played in coming 
to terms with the nature of and difference between rationalism and irrationalism. This angle 
of approach will pay attention to issues within the domains of systematic philosophy and the 
history of philosophy. Ponti also grappled with these issues. Our attention will be drawn to the 
distortions giving birth to rationalistic and irrationalistic orientations.
Because Parmenides, in his well-known didactical poem, identified thought and being and since 
being in this poem is described in spatial terms, the problem of rationality from early Greek 
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(Ir)rasionalisme: By die kruispad van historiese en sistematiese denke. Hierdie artikel 
is opgedra aan Ponti Venter vir sy bydrae tot die verstaan van die historiese wortels en 
sistematiese implikasies van wysgerige probleme. ’n Gesprek van sowat vier dekades gelede 
het my aangespoor om ondersoek na die Griekse agtergrond van ons onderskeiding tussen 
denke en syn in te stel. In die ontleding hieronder is ’n oorsigtelike skets van die aanvanklike 
identifisering van denke en syn in die gedagtegang van Parmenides geen die konsekwensies 
wat dit vir die rasionalistiese tradisie sedert die Renaissance gehad het gegee, veral in verband 
met die siening dat die heelal self ’n rasionele struktuur sou besit. Ons ontleding van die 
aard van die rasionalisme het twee opsies ondersoek: (1) kontrasteer dit met die empirisme 
en (2) let op die verband tussen universaliteit en dit wat individueel is. Deur te onderskei 
tussen begripskennis en begripstransenderende kennis word ’n alternatiewe sistematese 
karakterisering van rasionalisme (en irrasionalisme) voorgestel, naamlik dat dit begripskennis 
verabsoluteer (terwyl die irrasionalisme begripstransenderende kennis vergoddelik). Hierdie 
siening laat ruimte vir die erkenning van die ontiese horison van die menslike ervaring, 
mede-bepaald deur die dimensies van modale aspekte en tipe-wette, sonder om die menslike 
verstand tot die wetgewer van die wêreld te verhef.
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philosophy onwards was related to reflections on the nature 
of space. As an alternative to ‘continuous extension’ Ponti 
proposed the idea of ‘position’ (‘place’). The immediate effect 
of this conversation was that it prompted me to return to the 
sources of Western philosophy, namely to the early Greek 
philosophers.
The general habit of saying that rationalism is an 
absolutisation of (human) reason is not very illuminating, 
because the term ‘reason’ is not explained. What is reason? 
And what is rationality? Bernays introduced a meaningful 
consideration when he claimed that the crucial feature 
of rationality is found in the conceptual element (Bernays 
1974:601). This remark opens up the possibility to account for 
the nature of concept formation, which, in turn will lead us 
on the path to a number of related concerns. 
It will turn out that concepts are dependent upon 
distinguishing and identifying universal features. 
Universality, however, is nowhere encountered ‘on its own’, 
for it is always accompanied by what is individual. Yet, if 
concepts are constituted by universality, then it is evident 
that the individual side of entities – normally captured in the 
article ‘this’ – exceeds the grasp of concepts. The awareness 
of this chair (its individual side) unbreakably belongs to the 
being a chair (universal side) of this chair. Since Aristotle, the 
dominant legacy in Western thought holds that knowledge 
coincides with conceptual knowledge, which implies that 
what is individual cannot be known.
The mistaken restriction of knowledge to conceptual 
knowledge may be seen as a key characteristic of rationalism. 
Once this content is given to the term rationalism, the 
natural question of how knowledge is restricted to what is 
individual should be designated. It will be argued that this 
is just the other side of the rationalistic coin, because one can 
define irrationalism as an over-estimation of knowing what 
is individual and unique. The contrast between universality 
and what is individual implicitly explores key features of 
the aspects of number and space, for what is unique and 
individual highlights the quantitative intuition of being 
distinct. Within every multiplicity discrete individuals are 
discernible. Likewise, the awareness of universality rests 
on our intuition of space (‘place’ in the above-mentioned 
conversation between Ponti and myself), in the specified form 
of all places, everywhere. These distinctions will also appear 
to be significant for comprehending the elevation of human 
(conceptual) understanding to be the (formal) law-giver 
of nature (Immanuel Kant). The law conformity of entities 
is simply the correlate of the universality of laws for the 
existence of (natural and social) entities. It will therefore also 
be argued that order and orderliness (both universal traits) 
are not themselves rational, although they are intelligible. 
Historicism relativised universality with its focus on the 
unique and unrepeatable, thus simply advancing what we 
shall identify as an irrationalistic alternative to the dominant 
rationalism of the Enlightenment.
Against this background a few systematic considerations will 
be introduced, centred in the distinction between two kinds 
of knowledge: conceptual knowledge and concept-transcending 
knowledge. Proceeding from a non-reductionist ontology this 
alternative will attempt to rescue the soundness of these two 
kinds of knowledge and thus contribute to a more articulated 
understanding of both rationalism and irrationalism. The aim 
is thus to arrive at a non-distortive and non-reductionistic 
ontology.
We proceed now by first looking at some of the Greek 
roots of the problem of (ir)rationalism. This will provide us 
with background knowledge for the argument that space 
does play a key role in concept formation as well as in the 
definition of rationalism. Without an awareness of space, 
universality (at all places, wherever, everywhere) will not be 
understandable.
Space (place), multiplicity and 
movement
Parmenides, the Greek Eleatic philosopher, focused his 
philosophical reflections on (static) being and thinking. 
Regarding being he held the view that a thing is its place. The 
property ‘place’ is only applicable to a (material) body and 
when a body is absent there is no subject to which the feature 
‘place’ can be attributed.
This explains why Greek (nature) philosophy did not 
acknowledge an empty space – if the body, which is supposed 
to be identical to its place, is not present, then it is plain that 
there simply is no place (equal to no body). What developed 
here was a metaphysics of spatial place, identified by Parmenides 
with thinking: ‘for thinking and being is the same’ (Diels & 
Kranz 1959–1960, B Fragment 3). In the second Fragment it is 
asserted that what is is and that non-being is not. The space 
metaphysics in the thought of Parmenides acquired a fuller 
content when being is described as unborn and immutable, for 
in the now it is together present as a whole, as one, and as 
something coherent (continuous) (Diels & Kranz 1959–1960, 
B Fragm. 8:3–8). The remarkable fact is that although being 
is characterised as a coherent whole, its unity, which is fully 
homogenous, cannot be divided (Diels & Kranz 1959–1960, B 
Fragm. 8:23). Parmenides explored this space metaphysics in 
his attack both on multiplicity and on movement.
Yet it was Zeno, a member of the school of Parmenides, who 
first realised that wholeness (being a totality) can be divided 
and in fact entails the feature of an infinite divisibility (see 
Diels & Kranz 1959–1960, B Fragm. 3). The two parts of this 
Fragment both proceed from the assumption that there is a 
multiplicity, but they reach opposite conclusions. 
Aristotle explains discreteness in terms of things in succession 
such that ‘there is nothing of their own kind intermediate 
between them’. That ‘which is intermediate between points 
is always a line’ (Phys. 231 b 7–10 in Aristotle 2001:316). A 
line is therefore constituted by the pattern of point-line-
point-line-point-line …. From this Aristotle concludes that a 
continuous whole is infinitely divisible: ‘Moreover, it is plain 
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that everything continuous is divisible into divisibles that are 
infinitely divisible’ (Phys. 231 b 15–18 in Aristotle 2001:316).
In the first case there must be as many things as there are, 
in which case their number is limited, and in the second case 
there are always others in between such that the number of 
existing things is unlimited. Fränkel is justified in using the 
whole-parts relation to explain what is here at stake (Fränkel 
1968:425ff): if one starts from the (multiple but limited 
number of) parts and then proceeds to the whole that is 
constituted by this limited number of parts, then they add 
up to the whole. But if the different parts are further divided, 
this process of division can proceed indefinitely, and then the 
multiplicity is unlimited.1
Reason and reality
Throughout the history of philosophy and also within 
the various academic disciplines the dominant theoretical 
frameworks – since Thomas Kuhn, preferably designated 
as paradigms – struggled to articulate their respective 
understandings of the unity and diversity of reality. The 
word ‘reality’ is related to the Latin term for a thing (res). 
One of the misleading consequences of this connection is 
that existence is sometimes only ascribed to concrete entities 
(things). Whatever else there may be does not truly ‘exist’. 
This approach surfaced in particular during and after the 
Renaissance: just compare the representative conviction 
of Descartes, who holds that number and all universals 
are modes of thought (Principles of Philosophy, Part I, LVII in 
Descartes 1965:187). Descartes does acknowledge certain 
attributes as existing within things, whilst at the same time 
reifying certain aspects to substances, namely his well-
known res extensa and res cogitans (extended substance and 
thinking substance).
Whilst the substance concept largely dominated ancient 
Greek and Medieval philosophy, the rise and development of 
the modern natural sciences shifted focus towards functional 
relationships between things. Naturally this was enhanced 
by the mathematical formulation of natural laws and law-
conforming relations, which even prompted scholars to think 
that the universe itself has a rational structure. 
Van Huyssteen refers to Davies who believes that the ‘true 
miracle of nature’ is found ‘in the ingenious and unswerving 
lawfulness of the cosmos’ (Van Huyssteen 1998:66). 
Van Huyssteen accepts this view by declaring: ‘What is 
astounding, however, is to what a great extent our world 
is truly rational, that is, in conformity with human reason 
(p. 68). Three pages further he elaborates on this view:
It is indeed fascinating to see, precisely through the fact that 
the rational nature of our universe is reflected in its basic 
mathematical structure, that Davies ultimately comes to the point 
where he has to acknowledge the limits of this reasonableness. 
(Van Huyssteen 1998:71)
1.Bertrand Russell concedes: ‘The relation of whole and part is, it would seem, an 
indefinable and ultimate relation’ (Russell1956:138).
The crucial point in this stance is given in the idea that our world 
is truly rational in the sense that it is in conformity with human 
reason. To be in conformity with human reason presupposes 
that human reason acquired the status of being a law for the 
world which is conforming to this law. This view asserts that 
human understanding actually operates as a law (-giver) 
for the world. Although Van Huyssteen formulated this 
conviction within the context of his postmodern orientation, 
it is actually derived from the rationalistic tradition since the 
Renaissance – the line of Descartes, Hobbes up to Kant. The 
nominalistic denial of universality outside the human mind 
caused Descartes to hold that number and all universals 
are modes of thought (Principles of Philosophy, Part I, LVII 
inDescartes 1965:187). Kant defended the radical view that 
human understanding is the law-giver of nature, whilst it was 
already within the thought of Hobbes that the new (modern) 
motive of logical creation surfaced. Let us explain this in more 
detail.
The thought experiment conducted by Galileo eventually 
contributed to Kant’s idea that human understanding is the 
formal law-giver of nature. In 1638 he imagined a body in 
motion on a path extended into infinity. According to him 
– and this argument constitutes his law of inertia – such a 
body will continue its movement if nothing hampers it. This 
prompted Immanuel Kant to contemplate the question: how 
is it possible that one can produce a thought experiment 
merely proceeding from the spontaneous subjectivity of 
human thought and then deduce from it a natural law and 
apply it to moving bodies? Does this experiment entail that 
human knowledge serves as the law-giver of nature and that 
our understanding contains structural features preceding 
our experience?
This is what traditionally was designated as what is a priori 
to experience, that is, what precedes experience. Kant did not 
hesitate to affirm the claim that there are a priori elements 
of human understanding making possible our knowledge of 
reality.
The position assumed by Kant is an attempt to reconcile 
the extremes of assigning priority to human thinking or 
assigning it to sensory experience. An important element 
in the tradition of rationalism is found in the conviction that 
there are cognitions that are not derived from the senses 
since they find their origin purely within conceptual human 
understanding. Traditionally the basic opposition was 
between rationalism and empiricism, where the latter gave 
priority to our experience.2 By implementing the classical 
opposition between form and matter (content) Kant delivered 
the matter of human sensibility to a multiplicity of (individual) 
chaotic impressions (thus accommodating the empiricist 
tradition of Locke, Berkeley and Hume and continuing 
the nominalistic stripping of reality from its universal 
order and law-conforming orderliness), whilst at the same 
time postulating that the formal side represents something 
2.Ponti Venter often refers to both rationalism and irrationalism and his writings 
evince the consistent interplay of historical and systematic considerations (see, for 
example, Venter, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2012).
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supra-empirical. This applies first of all to what Kant called 
the forms of intuition (time and space) and secondly to the 
12 categories of human understanding distinguished by 
Kant. His view that human understanding creates its laws 
(a priori) not out of nature, but prescribes them to nature 
(Kant 1961:320; § 36)3 explains why it is still alleged that the 
world has a rational structure. Because this view elevates the 
human subject to the level of law-giver it is also designated 
as subjectivistic. However, such a view appears to contain an 
untenable circularity, aptly captured by Roy Clouser: ‘Unless 
there were already laws governing the mind that were not its 
creations, what would explain the uniformity of the ways the 
mind imposes laws on experience?’ (Clouser 2005:368).
In post-Kantian freedom idealism Fichte, Schelling and 
Hegel elaborated the rationalistic element by ascribing to 
human thought the capacity to conceptually bring forth the 
content of the world independent of experience. According 
to Hegel the idea is the unity of concept and reality (Hegel 
1949:239).4 This position once more evinces the perennial 
philosophical problem of thought and being. Cassirer remarks 
that it appears as if the circle of philosophical contemplation 
found its closure and reached its aim in identifying reality 
and reason: ‘Hegel believed that this is the point where his 
“Wissenschaft der Logik” is positioned’ (Cassirer 1957:10).
Understanding rationalism: Two 
options
Option 1
The one option is to juxtapose thought and experience (thinking 
and sensing) – when the former acquires priority it is 
designated as rationalistic and when the latter is given priority 
it is known as empiricistic. Windelband mentions Hobbes (De 
corpore, Ch. 6), who accepted the methodological orientation 
of Galileo, as being a rationalistic in opposition to the empiricism 
of Bacon (Windelband 1935:327, note 1). This opposition may 
also be explained with reference to the alternative views of 
Descartes and Hume. In a typical rationalist mode of thought 
Descartes holds: ‘At all events it is certain that I seem to see 
light, hear a noise, and feel heat; this cannot be false, and this 
is what in me is properly called perceiving (sentire), which is 
nothing else than thinking’(Meditation II; Descartes 1965:90, my 
italics). The contrasting view of Hume is: ‘To hate, to love, to 
think, to feel, to see; all this is nothing but to perceive’ (Hume 
1962:113). Either sensing is reduced to thinking or thinking 
(and everything else) is reduced to sensing.
Although Greek philosophy already gave prominence to 
reason (nous) the term rationalism was not employed yet. 
Anaxagoras characterised the eternal and immaterial form 
origin of the world as the Nous, which has all knowledge and 
the greatest power. It is not determined by any limits and it 
3.Cassirer explains this view of Kant with reference to the following statement of the 
latter: ‘das wir “von den Dingen nur das a priori erkennen, was wir selbst in ihr 
legen”’ [concerning things we can only know a priori that which we ourselves have 
embedded in them] (Cassirer 1957:239).
4.Hegel phrases it also as follows: ‘Idea is the unity of concept and reality, the realized 
concept as such’ (Hegel 1931:155).
is not mixed with germs of matter because it is self-sufficient 
(Diels & Kranz 1959–1960, B Fragment 6, 11, 12, 14). Later 
on, when Plato compared the good with the sun, it becomes 
clear that the ontic forms (eidè) owe their existence, being and 
knowability to the idea of the good. Viewed in coherence with 
the nature of the divine workman of Timaeus the idea of the 
good (agathon) has its seat in the divine demiurg (work master/
craftsman). The active operation of the nous with its focus 
on ordering is portrayed by Jäger as focused on the relation 
of the nous to the agathon. This illustrates the influence of 
Anaxagoras (and Socrates, nous and dynamics): through the 
primordial design of the idea tou agathou the workman, as the 
divine nous, is the origin of the eidè, and therefore the form-
giver of the world of the senses (see Jäger 1967:106ff).5
Thomas Aquinas held that the unity of ideas cannot be 
obtained by assuming just one idea in God. Rather, he holds, 
the multiplicity of ideas is constituted in such a way that the 
Divine Mind, as first form, observes the multiple possible ways 
according to which it can be copied (Questiones Disputate de 
Veritate, III, 2 in MacKenna 1956).
The first time the word ‘rationalist’ (rationaliste) was explicitly 
used was apparently in 1539 when it was already employed 
in opposition to experience (the empirical: empirique). A 
rationalist was seen as a person who assigned a greater 
value to pure thought than to experience. For some time, 
since the beginning of the 17th century, the term rationalism 
acquired a more specific theological meaning. An English 
source from the year 1646 mentions the rationalists as a new 
sect within the sphere of the Presbyterians and Independents 
whose adherents accepted their own reason as their point of 
departure (Böhling 1992:45).
At the time when the term rationalism was liberated from 
its theological use, it opened the way to describe the great 
philosophical systems of the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Simultaneously, atheists and those liberated in their thought 
introduced the term rationalism during the 19th century as a 
slogan against the superstition of traditional religions, whilst 
believing that they had reason and science on their side. 
Historians now also extrapolate the meaning of this term by 
generalising it mainly into the epoch of the Enlightenment. 
Rationalism combines the key elements of the Enlightenment, 
such as its criticism of understanding, its optimism and its 
faith in progress (Böhling 1992:46; see also Lecky 1910). 
Perhaps this insight may help us also to understand why 
Habermas, in his desire to make an ongoing plea for the 
dignity of rationality as it is embedded in communicative 
action, does not really want to transcend this essential trait of 
modernity, although he is willing to let go of the optimistic 
utilitarian spirit that marked its emergence in the period of 
Enlightenment:
5.In his negative theological approach Plotinus feared that the word demiurg may 
introduce multiplicity into the absolute One (first hypostasis). As a result he rather 
applies the term demiurg as designation of the Nous (second hypostasis). See 
Theiler (1966:127) and also Plotinus (En. 1I, 3, 18; II, 9, 6; V, 9, 3; MacKenna 1956).
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The concept of modernity no longer comes with a promise of 
happiness. But despite all the talk of postmodernity, there are 
no visible rational alternatives of this form of life. What else is 
left for us, then, but at least to search out practical improvements 
within this form of life? (Habermas 1994:107). 
Earlier in the 20th century we find a remarkable trust in 
human rationality. After Heidegger moved beyond the 
rationalism of Husserl, the latter experienced it with a sense of 
hopelessness positioned by him within the broader context of 
a crisis of Europe and of the academic disciplines. According 
to him this crisis is rooted in a misguided rationalism (‘einem 
sich verirrenden Rationalismus’):
In order to comprehend what is wrong in the present crisis the 
concept Europe once again has to be viewed by means of the 
historical directedness towards the infinite aims of reason; it 
must be demonstrated how the European world was borne from 
reason-ideas, that is, out of the spirit of philosophy. The crisis 
will then clearly emerge as the apparent failure of rationalism. 
The basis of this failure of a rational culture, however, … is not 
inherent to rationalism, since it is only found in its externalization, 
in its decay into naturalism and objectivism. The crisis of European 
existence provides only two options: the decline of Europe in 
the alienation from its own rational existential meaning, the 
decay into an animosity towards the spiritual and a lapse into 
barbarism, or the rebirth of European existence through the spirit 
of philosophy, particularly through a heroism of reason that will 
consistently triumph over naturalism. (Husserl 1954:347–348)
Option 2
The position of Husserl points in the direction of the other 
option open to an understanding of rationalism, which 
surfaces when we consider the connection between 
understanding and the difference between what is universal 
and what is individual. The problem of what is universal 
relates to the nature of concepts, for our argument is that 
concepts are bound to universal features. Yet in our 
everyday experience we always find universality and what 
is individual side by side (this horse is a horse). Since we do 
have knowledge of what is individual (we know ourselves in 
our uniqueness), the restriction of knowledge to conceptual 
knowledge is clearly problematic. The historically significant 
lines of development outlined below will elucidate this issue.
Traditionally, reason is said to be focused on the universal 
scope of conceptual knowledge. Already Aristotle had to 
switch from his purely individual proten ousian (primary 
substance) to the secondary substance, namely the universal 
substantial form of individual entities. By tradition, concepts 
are believed to be ‘blind’ to what is individual, explaining 
why Aristotle holds that knowledge is only possible of the 
universal essence of things, the just-mentioned secondary 
substance, the to ti en einai (De Anima, 412 b 16; cf. 414 a 9–11 
in Aristotle 2001). Nicolai Hartmann nonetheless points out 
that Aristotle does not have a concept of a concept (Hartmann 
1957:101). As general form knowledge, true knowledge cannot 
be obtained from matter. In his Metaphysics, Aristotle first 
eliminates all determinations of being and then concludes 
that matter as such is unknowable. He explains that when it 
comes to (individual) ‘concrete thing[s]’, ‘of these there is 
no definition’. Whatever is known ‘are always stated and 
recognized by means of the universal formula [secondary 
substance]. But matter is unknowable in itself’ (Metaph. 1036 
a 1–10 in Aristotle 2001:799). Aristotle therefore ultimately 
holds that knowledge is restricted to conceptual knowledge, 
made possible by what is universal. 
Cysarz points out that under the influence of Xenocrates an 
early goal of Aristotle was to accept an individual substrate, a 
‘próte usía’ which could be neither defined nor mathematically 
proven. It is precisely that which every child but no computer 
achieves: distinguish a rabbit from a dog. For this reason, so 
he concludes, a pure science of what is individual is impossible 
(Cysarz 1983:12–13).
Medieval Scholasticism continued this view by assigning 
universality to the human mind or intellect and what is 
individual to what could be sensed. What is individual is 
considered to be inexpressible (omne individuum est ineffabile). 
A well-known South African philosopher captures this 
legacy in a work on logic and epistemology and highlights 
the ‘individual delimitation’ (De Vleeschauwer 1952:213). 
Regarding what is individual, he holds that our intellectual 
capacities must fail because ‘knowledge of what is individual 
is simply impossible’ (according to De Vleeschauwer, 
philosophy had clarity about this issue since its inception, De 
Vleeschauwer 1952:213).
Within the development of modern philosophy one may 
see the 18th century, the era of Enlightenment, as a period in 
which conceptual rationalism dominated the scene. It echoes 
the new spirit of rational criticism, exemplified in what Kant 
said in the Foreword to the first edition (1781) of his Critique 
of Pure Reason:
Our age is, in every sense of the word, the age of criticism and 
everything must submit to it. Religion, on the strength of its 
sanctity, and law on the strength of its majesty, try to withdraw 
themselves from it; but by doing so they arouse just suspicions, 
and cannot claim that sincere respect which reason pays to those 
only who have been able to stand its free and open examination. 
(Kant 1961:21)
The rise of historicism during the transition from the 18th 
to the 19th century made possible a new appreciation of 
what is unique, individual and contingent as an attempt 
to escape from the grip of conceptual knowledge and its 
entailed universality. In the Third Part of the Fourth Volume 
of his work on the problem of knowledge within philosophy 
and the modern sciences, Ernst Cassirer dedicates the first 
chapter to the emergence of historicism and the second 
one to the ideas of B.G. Niebuhr, Leopold von Ranke 
and Wilhelm von Humboldt (see Cassirer 1957:225ff, 
233ff). Cysarz characterises the 19th century as the era of 
individuality (Cysarz 1983:16). He could have added the issue 
of continuous change, with reference to Darwin‘s theory of 
evolution.
During the 19th century, the tension between the general 
nature of concepts and what is uniquely historical could 
not be reconciled. Habermas mentions that, analogous to 
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Peirce, Dilthey also struggled with the relationship between 
universality and what is individual (see Habermas 1970:200–
201). He explains that hermeneutical understanding must grasp 
an inexpressible individual meaning in categories that are 
unavoidably general (Habermas 1970:201).6
Yet, as Cysarz correctly remarks, every (professional) 
practice must proceed in an individual manner. What is 
healed in medical praxis is not illness, but the individual 
sick person, even though this cannot happen outside the 
matrix of general norms (standards) (Cysarz 1983:13). This 
remark highlights an important fact, namely that whatever 
is universal is always accompanied by what is individual 
and vice versa. An individual sick person shows, in its 
being sick, that it shares in the universal feature of sickness. 
A succinct way to capture this situation is to say that this 
sick person (individual side) has an illness (universal side). 
Clearly, sickness, even in its abnormality, displays universal 
abnormal traits. Disorderliness depends like a parasite on 
what is normal.
The challenge facing a systematic 
account of rationalism
Our preceding analysis made it clear that an account of the 
nature of an ism such as rationalism cannot avoid taking into 
account the relevant historical perspectives. In pursuing this 
avenue particular distinctions emerged, such as that between 
the ‘rational’ and the ‘empirical’. Poser (1998) relates this 
distinction to the difference between Descartes and Leibniz 
in his discussion of what he calls the ‘rationalistic ideal of 
science’. Leibniz criticised Descartes by introducing his 
concept of a scientia generalis (general science). However, he 
articulated a distinction between necessary truths of reason and 
contingent truths of fact (Leibniz 1976:646; Monadology, 33ff). A 
similar distinction is found in the thought of Locke, namely 
that between empirical factual knowledge and knowledge of 
the necessary eternal relations between ideas (Locke 1964:324–
326; IV, i, 9), as well as his introduction of intuition as the 
foundation of exact scientific knowledge (for instance in 
the demonstrations in mathematics, cf. Locke 1964:330–331; 
IV, ii, 14–15). This distinction contradicts his empiricist 
orientation because with the aid of intuitive demonstration 
one can arrive at a kind of knowledge that ‘is the clearest and 
most certain human frailty is capable of’ (Locke 1964:326).
The position assumed by Leibniz anticipated the views of 
Kant: just consider the following statement of Leibniz (1965):
Now reflection is nothing but an attention to what is in us, and 
the senses do not give us what we already bring with us. This 
being so, can we deny that there is a great deal that is innate in 
our mind, since we are innate, so to speak, to ourselves, and since 
there is in ourselves being, unity, substance, duration, change, 
activity, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other objects of 
our intellectual ideas? And since these objects are immediate to 
our understanding and are always present, ... why be surprised 
6.‘Das hermeneutische Verstehen muß in unvermeidlichallgemeinen Kategorien einen 
unveräusserlich individuellen Sinn erfassen.’ [Hermeneutic understanding must 
enter an inalienable individual sense inevitable in general categories].
that we say that these ideas, and everything which depends on 
them, are innate in us?’ (p. 146, cf. p. 173)
On the verge of anticipating Kant’s criticism of Hume’s 
empiricism, Leibniz, more than 30 years before the first 
appearance of Hume’s A treatise of human nature (1739), wrote 
as follows in his New Essays:
Now all the examples which confirm a general truth, whatever 
their number, do not suffice to establish the universal necessity 
of that same truth, for it does not follow that what has happened 
will always happen in the same way. (quoted from Stich 1975:45, 
cf. Kant 1787:5)
Paul Bernays, the co-worker of the famous German 
mathematician David Hilbert, points out that rationality 
cannot be understood apart from concepts: the ‘proper 
characteristic of rationality’ is ‘to be found in the conceptual 
element’ (Bernays 1974:601). This view supports what we 
saw above, namely that in general rationality is crucially 
connected to conceptual knowledge and to universality. 
Universality, in turn, cannot be understood apart from its 
connection to what is individual. 
Note that we rather speak of ‘what is individual’ than of 
‘individuality’ because the latter is still a universal feature. 
In being an individual every individual, in a universal way, 
evinces its uniqueness. We noted that in our everyday 
experience we fully understand the difference between a 
chair (a universal feature) and this chair (its individual side).
A systematic perspective
From a historical perspective we have directed our attention 
to the opposition of thought and experience which, owing 
to an over-emphasis of the one or the other, may lead to 
rationalism or to empiricism. Yet, this juxtaposition does not 
say anything substantial about rationalism as such. For this 
reason we extended our investigation in order to reflect on 
the context within which rationalism is positioned. This 
reflection pointed at the connections between rationality, 
conceptuality, universality and what is individual.
The tradition of reformational philosophy provides the 
starting point for an understanding of these issues. For this 
reason we briefly look at points of connection in this regard 
in order to advance an alternative approach in terms of the 
distinction between conceptual knowledge and concept-
transcending knowledge.
Within the tradition of reformational philosophy, the 
emphasis on making sound distinctions created an equally 
important sensitivity with regard to reductionism in all 
its negative variants. Both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven 
articulated their views in terms of well-thought-out 
systematic distinctions and they both attached specific 
meanings to terms capturing those philosophical stances in 
which a distorted account is given of universally accessible 
states of affairs. 
Interestingly, Vollenhoven explicitly mentions that 
rationalists from the 18th century, such as J.G. Walch in his 
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introduction to philosophy of 1727, maintain ‘that what he 
and those who thought like him – the rationalists – had to say 
was built on the state of affairs’ (Vollenhoven 2005:5). 
He briefly discusses the slogan of Descartes, cogito ergo sum 
(I think therefore I am), by pointing out that some are of the 
‘opinion that this “therefore” denotes a connection of identity’. 
But according to him this is incorrect, ‘for Descartes does not 
identify being and thinking’ since besides thinking he ‘also 
presupposes extension’; therefore, for Descartes ‘thinking is 
only a component of being’ (Vollenhoven 2005:10).
Yet Vollenhoven (2005) on the same page points out that:
Descartes meant this in a rationalistic way, that is, in the sense 
that thinking is the essence of being; an opinion that we, of 
course, reject, as much as we reject the division of being indicated 
here. (p. 10) 
This does not entail that Vollenhoven think it is ‘rationalistic’ 
‘to subsume thinking and knowing under being, for it makes 
good sense to speak of a non-thinking and a non-knowing 
being. There are clearly many things – for example, minerals, 
plants, and animals – that are but that do not know’. 
Vollenhoven therefore concludes negatively ‘that knowing 
is not the same as being’ and positively ‘that knowing is a 
component of being’ (Vollenhoven 2005:10).7
In general Dooyeweerd refers to the strict correlation of 
the law side (cosmonomic side) and factual side of reality 
in order to explain how he understands both rationalism 
and irrationalism. In the first Volume of his Magnum Opus, 
A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (NC), he states that in 
a rationalistic type of thinking ‘the subject-side of reality 
within the special modal aspects is reduced to the nomos-
side’ (Dooyeweerd 1997:98). In the context of his philosophy 
of time he rejects both rationalistic and irrationalistic 
conceptions because the former ‘absolutizes the cosmonomic 
side and the latter the factual-subjective side of time’ 
(Dooyeweerd 1997:28; see also Dooyeweerd 1940:196).
However, Dooyeweerd did not properly distinguish between 
law and law-conformity (lawfulness). He frequently exchanged 
these expressions. Earlier we remarked that universal 
conditions ought to be distinguished from the universal way 
in which individual entities show that they conform to these 
conditions or laws. By identifying law and law conformity 
Dooyeweerd strips factual reality of its universal side. For this 
reason he often explicitly speaks of the individual factual side.
Although concretely existing things and processes function 
within all aspects of reality, they at the same time transcend 
the theoretical grasp of anyone of these modal aspects 
in which such entities and processes function. We have 
theoretical access to them through the gateway of the modal 
aspects which therefore also serve as modes of explanation for 
our investigations.
7.Embedded in a different context Mekkes emphasised the difference between 
integral knowing and mere thinking (see Mekkes 1970:12, 13, 84, 86, 89, 123, 
128–9, 138, 141, 153-154, 159, 168, 172, 180, 195, 205, 218–219, 221, 226, 230).
Concept formation is made possible by the universality of 
specific (logically identifiable and distinguishable) features. 
The universality here involved could be either that of a 
universal order for, holding for the type of entities subject to it, 
or it can refer to the universal orderliness of things, reflecting the 
universal way in which entities show that they are subjected 
to the applicable order for their existence. Since conceptual 
knowledge is tied up with these two forms of universality 
(order for and orderliness of), the individual side of entities 
simply transcends the possibilities of conceptual knowledge. 
When we acknowledge that what is individual exceeds our 
conceptual grasp, it does not imply that we do not have 
knowledge of what is individual. But if this knowledge cannot 
be conceptual, it must be concept transcending. This kind of 
knowledge may also be designated as idea knowledge.
Proper conceptual knowledge of a triangle or a human being 
includes those universal features found in all triangles and 
all human beings. Since this kind of knowledge does not 
preclude concept-transcending knowledge (idea knowledge), 
a balanced (and non-reductionist) understanding of reality 
should acknowledge both. 
On the basis of this characterisation and distinction we can 
now introduce a more advanced definition of rationalism 
and irrationalism:
1. Rationalism deifies (absolutises) conceptual knowledge.
2. Irrationalism deifies (absolutises) concept-transcending 
knowledge.
An additional perspective on idea knowledge is obtained 
when the various ways in which terms derived from the 
different modal aspects of reality are employed. The most 
basic option is to consider modal (aspectual) terms in their 
reference to phenomena appearing within the domain of 
any specific aspect. For example, no one will doubt that 
our awareness of the ‘one and the many’ presupposes the 
meaning of number. Counting a number of things usually 
follows a sequential pattern that exhibits an order of succession, 
albeit in a cardinal (how many: one, two three, etc.) or ordinal 
sense (how many-th: first, second, third, etc.) (see Maddy 
1997:17). But when Plato discusses the hypothesis that the 
One is without multiplicity (subsequently further explored 
by Plotinus), the numerical term ‘one’ points beyond the 
arithmetical aspect towards the origin of the universe. In this 
case the numerical one is stretched beyond the confines of 
the quantitative aspect of reality, revealing that it is actually 
employed in a concept-transcending sense. In a similar way one 
may reflect on the mere conceptual use of spatial terms and 
ways in which spatial terms are employed in order to refer to 
realities exceeding the boundaries of the spatial aspect.
We have noted earlier that although Greek philosophy initially 
wrestled with an idea of wholeness not allowing division, the 
ripened conception of Aristotle saw that anything continuous 
could be divided into divisible parts (see Aristotle, Phys. 234 
a 8 inAristotle 2001:322). His general and encompassing 
description reads: ‘Everything continuous is divisible into 
divisibles that are infinitely divisible’ (Aristotle, Phys. 231 b 
15–18 in Aristotle 2001:317).
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If all the divided parts are taken together they constitute a 
genuine whole or totality. A conceptual use of the terms whole 
or totality will refer to spatial figures, such as lines or two-
dimensional figures. Suppose now that we use these spatial 
terms in order to refer to the existence of something in all 
it aspects (of which the spatial is but one amongst many 
others). Then we may speak of that something in its totality. 
The referent of this term encompasses more than the spatial 
aspect alone and therefore represents a concept-transcending 
use of a modal spatial term.
Although the relationship between what is universal and 
what is individual may suggest that an over-estimation 
of either could be captured in the opposition between 
universalism and individualism,8 it is preferable to reserve 
the latter opposition as an indication of alternative basic 
denominators for the diversity of ontic aspects and entities 
– alongside ismic orientations such as physicalism, vitalism, 
psychologism, logicism, economism, aestheticism, and so on.
Dooyeweerd uses the correlation of law side and individual 
factual side to characterise the difference between rationalism 
and irrationalism. We noted that he denies universality at the 
factual side of reality and consistently identifies the orderliness 
of entities, their lawfulness, law-conformity of factual 
universality, with the law side of reality. This explains why 
Dooyeweerd consistently refers to the individual subject side 
of reality. However, when it is realised that law-conformity 
is a feature of factual reality, then it is no longer possible to 
deny the universal side of factual reality. In the atom-ness 
of an atom this (individual) atom in a (universal) way shows 
that it is subject to the universal law (conditions) for being 
an atom (where being an atom represents the universal side 
of an atom). But then a more appropriate understanding of 
rationalism is to define it as an absolutisation of conceptual 
knowledge. Likewise, irrationalism should then be seen as 
an absolutisation of concept-transcending knowledge. Of 
course rationalism then cannot any longer be defined as 
an absolutisation of the law side of reality, as Dooyeweerd 
did, because universality is also present at the factual side 
of reality. Furthermore, it is then also insufficient to define 
irrationalism as an absolutisation of the factual side of reality.
In other words, it seems as though it is more nuanced to 
advance our proposal, namely to hold that rationalism 
leaves no room for true concept-transcending knowledge 
whilst irrationalism leaves no room for genuine conceptual 
knowledge. In terms of this perspective an acknowledgement 
of the horizon of human experience and the dimensions of 
(ontic) modal aspects and type laws is meaningful. It at once 
avoids elevating human understanding to the a law-giver 
of the world, which ultimately is a full-blown rationalistic 
conviction.
Concluding remark
It is remarkable to what an extent an analysis of the nature 
of rationalism and irrationalism succeeds in bringing widely 
8.Vollenhoven uses the terms universalism and individualism to indicate an over-
estimation of individuality and universality, respectively.
varying features and theoretical orientations to the fore. 
The uniqueness of number and space played a key role 
since the awareness of what is individual derives from the 
numerical meaning of discreteness (being distinct), whereas 
the awareness of universality derives from our spatial 
awareness of place, to be sure, all places, wherever. It appeared 
that we have to question the long-standing legacy in Western 
philosophy which restricts knowledge to conceptual 
knowledge. Knowledge is not blind to what is individual; 
it is only conceptual knowledge that cannot grasp what is 
individual. Yet, when we realise that knowledge differentiates 
into two kinds of knowledge, namely conceptual knowledge 
and concept-transcending knowledge, it turns out that we 
can avoid the one-sidedness present in both rationalistic and 
irrationalistic approaches.
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